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ABSTRACT

In the past couple of decades, many scholars have debated the worthiness of the limited monopoly
that patent law provides. The widespread attitude has always been, since the progress of the
technological era, that in order to stimulate inventors and possessors of knowledge to embody their
knowledge by innovative products, and produce ameliorations into society, they should be given
strong proprietary rights over their innovative information and ideas.
With the rise of the economic analysis of law, dissident opinions have been starting to emerge,
evoking the social damage absorbed due to the current patent system monopoly character in form of
a deadweight loss imposed over economic surplus.
This article discusses the deficiencies and benefits that exist in the current legal system as they
relate to limited monopoly of a patent. Next, it reviews some significant points of view by scholars
who approached the aforesaid dispute via an economic analysis. Finally, this article suggests
guidelines for a compromise efficient incentive for inventors, which will balance competition
rationales.
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PATENT LAW IN THE ANTITRUST SCOPE: BETWEEN SOCIAL ADVANCEMENT
AND COMPETITION IMPINGEMENT
YANIV GAL*

Shouldn't courts be able to use antitrust rules to identify an improper expansion of a
patent monopoly?'
[P]atentprotection is the negative externality exchanged for the positive externality of
progress in the patent bargain.2

INTRODUCTION

Since the early to middle 1800s, English jurisprudence legitimated the United
States ("U.S.") society's responsibility for granting rights over intellectual property
and implementation of knowledge, by privileging inventors with exclusive
commercial rights over their inventions. 3 The social rational for such a right is to
stimulate those who possess knowledge and the relevant implementation know-how. 4
Accordingly, society enjoys modernism and advancement in relation to technology
(patents), media (copyrights), designs (design rights), and commercialization
(trademarks).
U.S. common law recognizes the intellectual assets of those who implement their
knowledge for consumption, as their own private property for a limited period of
time, after which the implementation will become public property and the know-how
will enter the public domain to be freely accessed. 5 De facto implementation of
knowledge, in relation to inventions ascribed to an exclusive patentee, will not
provide the desired optimal outcome in supplying the demand. 6 Thus, society will be
temporarily deprived of almost any benefit, which stems from a public access regime.

*C Yaniv Gal 2011. Yaniv Gal is a practicing attorney licensed in Israel, specializing in
commerce and insurance law. Yaniv graduated in law (LL.B) and business administartion (B.A)
from the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya, Israel, 2009. The author wishes to thank
Dr. Assaf Jacob (IDC), for his professional orientation and encouragement.
1Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55 HASTINGS
L.J. 399, 400 (2003).
2 Rudolph J.R. Peritz, Rethinking U.S. Antitrust and Intellectual Property Rights 15 (N.Y.L.
Sch. Inst. for Info. Law & Policy, Working Paper No. 22, 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=719745.
3 Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (1836) (current version at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2006)).
4

WILLIAM CORNISH & DAVID LLEWELYN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
TRADEMARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS 133-34 (Sweet & Maxwell 6th ed. 2007).

635 U.S.C.

PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS,

§ 154(a).

6 RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST

LAW 16 (Univ. of Chicago Press 2d ed. 2001).
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During the early and mid-1900s, American scholars developed antitrust
doctrines under capitalistic trade perceptions. 7 These antitrust doctrines recognize
that by granting exclusive commercial rights, or providing the means for a party to
attain or to amplify that party's market power (as will be explained further on, in
Part IV.B.2), society will be harmed by decreasing the consumer's purchasing power. 8
This leads to a reduction in the economic surplus; a greater reduction in the
consumer's surplus than in the manufacturer's surplus. 9
In order to balance the opposing effects of patent and antitrust laws, certain
intersections between those laws have necessitated that the laws be amended. Such
amendments include:
excluding patentees from antitrust doctrine directives;
enabling patentees to trade as sole traders (monopolists);10 permitting patentees to
engage in pricing methods in disregard for other manufacturers;" and forbidding
patent holders from not occupying or developing their patent while enjoying
exclusivity, commonly referred to as the "patent misuse" doctrine1 2-as will be
discussed in Part IV.B.6.
Eventually, and in spite of the aforesaid, the equilibrium obtained between the
patentee's supply and the consumer's demand, under micro-economic analysis, does
not yield maximum output per price. 13
As we shall see, a clear distinction between both mechanisms is unsuitable, and
results in either: harming social progress by creating a barrier between market
segments which causes a reduction in gross welfare (an impact over outputs and
quantities of innovation consumed); or diminishing the innovative progress of the
implementation of information (impacting the advancement and quality of the
patented knowledge).
This article will attempt to clarify the importance, and propose guidelines for, a
model binding both patent law rights and antitrust law doctrines in order to perfect
social welfare enhancement. Further, the article will review whether it is justified to
privilege patentees, by excluding others from engaging in research and development
of their patents, from the standpoint that the patentee should be incentivized in
order to produce an advanced solution as soon as possible. If such a justification
exists, then what amount of disruption to competition will be desirable before casting
a burden over society, harming the system of free competition?

7See, e.g., Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006)) (limiting cartels and monopolies to protect consumers from competitive
practices that advance the cost of the consumer); Clayton Antitrust Act, ch. 323, §§ 1-26, 38 Stat.
730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2006)) (adding further substance to the U.S.
antitrust law regime by seeking to prevent anticompetitive practices in their starting point);
Robinson-Patman Act, ch. 592, § 1, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 13
(2006)) (prohibiting anticompetitive practices by producers, specifically price discrimination).
8 See infra Part IV.B.
9Donald Dewey, Antitrust and Economic Theory: An Uneasy Friendshtip, 87 YALE L.J. 1516,
1520 (1978).
10 See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 248 (2003).
11See id.
1235 U.S.C. § 27 1(d) (2006); see infra Part IV.B for a discussion on the patent misuse doctrine.
13POSNER, supra note 6, at 16.
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I. ANTITRUST LAW-AN INTRODUCTION

A. Overview of Antitrust Law
Antitrust law, manifested in the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 ("Sherman Act")
prohibits all kinds of trusts whether by contract, syndication, monopolization,
attempts at monopolization, and conspiracies, that restrain trade or commerce, either
positively acting or by omission. 14 The essence of antitrust law is to forbid
cartelization by firm collaboration, monopolization, or attempting to monopolize by
merger, and at all, as inchoately ordained. 15 This goal is phrased in sections one and
two of the Sherman Act, forbidding as follows:
[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. 16
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations.17
The primary concern of the Sherman Act, as it was laid in front of its framers
was to protect small businesses from low pricing competition of trusts, due to the
inherent disadvantage of the former.1 8 By form, the Sherman Act, as other antitrust
legislation from the nineteenth century, had little to do with allocative efficiency;
nevertheless, before that era, antitrust policy had been of no major importance. 19
Therefore, in order to clarify and enhance antitrust policy, Congress has amended
antitrust doctrines, 20 by inserting a standard of preserving competitive pricing,
accordingly setting the derived rule against price fixing. 21
These amendments bind antitrust laws with efficient economic parameters,
rather than small businesses' and consumers' concern for wealth and welfare.
Therefore, it becomes apparent that all cartels, collusive pricing, and other ways of
price-fixing are unequivocally illegal due to their inefficiency. 22
The implementation of combining antitrust law with parameters, like with
efficiency in Socony-Vacuum Ol, 23 regards any attempt to control market prices (i.e.,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006).
15See infra Part I.B (discussing the private enforcement of antitrust law by the Clayton Act).
16 15 U.S.C. § 1.
17Id. § 2
18See POSNER, supra note 6, at 34.
19See id. at 35.
14

20See id.

21See United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 339 (1897).
22See POSNER, supra note 6, at 36 (explaining that the objectivity of the ruling of the illegality
of price fixing was to annul the reasonable basis of price fixed price agreements or cartels, therefore
resulting that the "reasonable price" is that which constitutes a competitive price).
23United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
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price fixing), as a breach of antitrust law, without having to show a true effect over
the market, or probable success. 24 Therefore, all types of monopolies, attempts to
monopolize, cartelization and any method formed in purpose or merely contributing
to influence market prices, are ostensibly inefficient and legally bound, they
undermine free competition rationales and competitive pricing trade. 25 Moreover,
the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the Sherman Act holds that any
mechanism having the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging or stabilizing
prices as illegal. 26 This has been true even if such actions do not necessarily result in
a monopoly but are merely aimed to award unequal distribution power in the
market-such as conspiring to control market prices. 27
In 1914, the second chapter of antitrust law was written, well known as the
Clayton Antitrust Act ("Clayton Act"). 28 Section 2 consists of, among other things,
prohibitions on price discrimination, 29 and section 3 contains prohibitions on tying in
exclusive dealing. 30 Both courses of action can diminish competition or manifest in
Id. at 224.
at 223. Justice Douglas stated that, "[m]arket manipulation in its various manifestations
is implicitly an artificial stimulus applied to ... market prices, a force which distorts those prices, a
factor which prevents the determination of those prices by free competition alone." Id. (emphasis
added).
26 Id. at 221.
27 Id.
In Justice Douglas's definitive words: "Any combination which tampers with price
structures . . . ." disregarding the significance of a true potential for influencing the market. Id.
(emphasis added). Thus, controlling or acting to control market prices, indistinctively constitutes an
illegal trust, breaching the competitive system protected under Sherman Act. Id.
28 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2006).
See also Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 5(a)(1)
(2006) (forbidding "unfair methods of competition").
29 15 U.S.C. § 13(a). Section 2 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different
purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the
purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such
commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale . . . and where the effect of
such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition
with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such
discrimination, or with customers of either of them: provided, [t]hat nothing
herein contained shall prevent differentials which make only due allowance for
differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the
differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers
sold or delivered. . . where it finds that available purchasers in greater quantities
are so few as to render differentials on account thereof unjustly discriminatory or
promotive of monopoly in any line of commerce.
Id. (emphasis added).
30 Id. § 14. Section 3 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract fur sale of goods, wares,
merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or
unpatented, for use, consumption, or resale .. ,. or fix a price charged therefore, or
discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition, agreement, or
understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the
goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities of a
24

25 Id.
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monopolies.
Section 2, which had been amended to the Clayton Act in 1936
(hereinafter will be referred to as part of the Act), is also known as the RobinsonPatman Act. 31 Similar to the Sherman Act, Congress's intention was to secure the
market shares of small businesses and prohibit price discrimination. 32 Some may say
it concerns mainly distributionaljustice rather than market efficiency. 33

B. The Antitrust Standard
Exercising the full rigor of the law, regarding antitrust rationales, requires an
efficient enforcement mechanism, which can generate a cause of action whenever a
breach of the Sherman or Clayton Act statutes occurs, either by an individual or by a
firm, engaging or conspiring to engage in any illegal trust. 34
The Sherman Act prohibits the achievement of the restraint of trade,
monopolies, cartels, and other forms of trust. 35 The Clayton Act, as amended, will be
enforced where measures that might have been taken which might lessen
competition, or tend to create monopoly power. 36 In other words, antitrust law
prohibits both firms or individuals from engaging in predatory practices that are
meant to exclude competition, thus gaining extra "market power" 37 instead of
practices that naturally flows from the firm's performance. However, the fact that a
firm has monopoly power does not mean that the law should prevent it from
competing. 38
The Sherman Act, joined with the Clayton Act, provide the U.S. government the
power to break up trusts in restraint of trade, and maintain an effective free-

competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale,
or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be to
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce.
Id. (emphasis added).
31 Robinson-Patman Act, ch. 592, § 1, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 13
(2006)); see supra note 7 and accompanying text, and infra Part IV.B for the relevant methods of
price discriminating in our context.
32 See infra Part IV.B (discussing the relevant methods).
33 See CLIFFORD A. JONES, PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF ANTITRUST LAW IN THE EU, UK AND

USA 12 (Oxford Univ. Press 1999).
34 United States statutes which enable enforcement of antitrust law include section 7 of the
Sherman Act, sections 4(a) and 10 of the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act. See
infra Part IV.B.
35 CLIFFORD, supra note 33, at 10 (noting that courts have established a "rule of reason" under
which only an unreasonablerestrain of competition is unlawful).
36 Id. These two statutes, which make up the antitrust standard, should not to be read in
isolation. Instead, they should be read together as clarifying the defense which can be granted to
the potential competitor-manufacturer, and in particular small businesses, by specifying causes of
action, in both civil and criminal law (Sherman Act and Clayton Act, respectively), impelling
reasonabilityfactor into the standard. Id. See POSNER, supra note 6, at 195.
37 See POSNER, supra note 6, at 195-96.
38Id. at 196. The antitrust standard does not constitute a sweeping taboo over gaining market
power, however it imposes a prudence duty in English jurisprudential interpretation, which is
embraced in this article regarding the standard. See infra Part I.C.
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competition market, or at least to reduce potential damage to the economic surplus
(see explanation at Part IV.B), stemming from excessive market power. 39
The antitrust standard, drawn by the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, as
amended, is bound to market efficiency, and comprises the cornerstone of the new
modern age common law standard, as manifested by western legislation. It will be
used as a basic assumption for this article, regarding efficiency analysis of
competition rationales.

C. A Statutory Prudence Duty
English law, which imposes a suitable and expedient duty of prudence, favors
the protection of an integrated commerce and competition model. 40 Competition law
(the English parallel to U.S. antitrust law) averts the use of a dominant position in a
market, similar to what was referred above, in part, as "market power," for certain,
anti-competitive purposes. 41 The outcome of such 'use' will result in a breach of
section 36 of the New Zealand Commerce Act 1986.42 The section of the Act that
deals with misuse of substantial market power, is as follows:
No person who has a dominant position in a market shall use that position
for the purpose of -(a) Restricting the entry of any person into that or any other market; or
(b) Preventing or deterring any person from engaging in competituive conduct
in that or in any other market; or
(c) Eliminating any person from that or any other market. 43
Yet, it should be mentioned that
enforcement of the Act, by virtue of the
patent. 44 One of the essential inquiries
question has a dominant position in the

sub-section two of the Act restricts any
New Zealand statute, against a protected
of the Act is whether or not the party in
market.45 Hence, a breach of the Act will

39 See e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 343-44 (1962). In this context,
antitrust law, especially the Clayton Act, is not dedicated solely to the protection of competitors and
firms, rather protecting competition at whole, by decentralizing firms' market power and preserving
an "effective competition". Id.; see also infra Part IV.B (explaining the potential damage to economic
surplus).
40For this context, we examine New Zealand commerce law, as a derivative from English

jurisprudence.

41See Section 36 ofthe Commerce Act 1986 (N.Z.) [hereinafter N.Z. Commerce Act].

Id
43 Id. (emphasis added).
42

45New Zealand Magic Millions Ltd. v. Wrightson Bloodstock Ltd. (1989) NZLR LEXIS 720,
(HC) *4.
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occur when competition, actual or potential, 46 is harmed by a party, while keeping in
mind, that the Act should be interpreted in a practical sense. 47

II. MONOPOLY ADVANTAGES

A. Does Exclusivuty Have Social Worth?

1. Introduction
The main question, regarding the social interest in allowing an individual or a
single firm to enjoy monopoly power, should be whether the monopoly promotes
innovativeness and efficiency.
As Professor Posner describes in his book, the
question should be answered empirically rather than decisively. 48 This article will
face the debate over the monopoly term of patentable innovations, looking first at a
normative point of view, which examines the economic justifications-the
contribution to social advancement 49-via the patent in dispute. 50 Next it will look at
the consequences of the monopoly from a descriptive aspect. 51 The discussion will
start by understanding the grounds for this debate.

2. The Dispute
Take two regimes, one which allows an individual to effectively influence the
market and market prices, and another which prohibits any sort of interference with
free market competition. In which of these two regimes, will the inventor be more
stimulated to invent? In which of them, will society achieve optimal innovative
progress:
where the prices for innovations are fixed and the inventor enjoys
monopoly incentives, or where pricing is competitive, not granting inventors an
option to influence the market? The overlap between antitrust law and patent law
will be discussed when examining the cost-efficiency (i.e. social efficiency) of the
patent regime.
46 Id. at *5; N.Z. Commerce Act, § 3(1) (defining 'competition' as "workable or effective
competition") (emphasis added).
47
Magic Millions Ltd., (1989) NZLR LEXIS 720 at *5.
48 POSNER, supra note 6, at 20.
49 See infra Part III.B (explaining how social advancement and innovative information can
expand the public domain).
50See generally Eunice A. Eichelberger, Brining of Patent Infringement Suit as Violation of
Section 1 and 2 of Sherman Act, 62 A.L.R. FED. 203 (1983) (discussing the interplay of patent rights
in the antitrust context).
51See infra Part IV (discussing whether the diminution of free competition around the patent
affects social welfare, substantially harming the competition variables, and affects whether the loss
of a free competition around the patented information (the deadweight loss described at Figure 3
and Figure 4, below as deadweight loss), is being undertaken, eventually, by society.
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In addition, the following two interlaced questions should be in mind while
trying to balance the patent system with the antitrust standards previously
discussed in Part I.B, preserving competition rationales: (1) does monopoly power
undoubtedly promote innovativeness, or rather subjected to every case (or patentable
category), can we find an empirical algorithm that determines ad-hoc directives (the
normative question); and (2) what are the expectations of promoting innovation by
granting monopolization security (the descriptive question)?
What should the economic meaning be for the result drawn from question two?
In the sense of cost-effectiveness, what will the free market suffer from in favor of the
above advantages? The article will discuss those questions extensively in Part IV.B.

3. Cost Reduction
By assuming that patented products benefit in direct proportion from lawful
trusts (in this case, monopoly power), one wrongfully ignores the presumption by
which a manufacturer, acting in a competitive market, expects a greater return on
investment ("ROI") for his effort, than does a single inventor, enjoying monopoly
power.52 Therefore, the manufacturer will be more stimulated to both reduce costs
and enhance quality while embodying its knowledge. On the other hand, by enabling
others to promptly copy innovations without carrying the burden of research and
development ("R&D") costs, generates an unjust situation, 53 whereas the inventor
may not be able to recoup those costs, which leads to inefficiency, which may
disincentive inventors to innovate. 54 From the consumer's point of view, by limiting
the monopoly inventors will be forced to reduce costs, in order to match competitive
pricing.
Resultantly, cost reduction is more likely to take place under free competition
than under patent monopoly.5 5 Thus, it can be deduced that the more significant the
patent prerogative is, the more market price will rise. It can also be concluded that a
competitive manufacturer will seek to enhance ROI more than an exclusive
manufacturer, inter alia by reducing R&D costs, in order to gain revenues as soon as
possible.

4. Quality Enhancement
By granting monopoly power, society aims for the market to benefit in quality. 56
The measures applicable to enhancing quality in the market are: entrepreneurship

52 POSNER, supra note 6, at 18 (explaining that the reason for differentiation between the
expected return, stems from a micro-economic explanation regarding the effect that monopoly has
over the supply and demand model).

SSAriel Katz, Making Sense of Nonsense: Intellectual Property,Antirust, and Market Power, 49
ARIZ. L. REV. 837, 840-41 (2007).
56 See infra Part IV.A (describing "quality" as one of the competition variables).
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incentives; the ability to set high standards; and the protection of inventors ex post.5 7
Accordingly, society desires that improvements will enter the market in the most
efficient way by the original inventor. Notwithstanding, it is evident that the market
will be damaged in quality when more advanced, better skilled and resourced market
players, are excluded from participation in the development, or use of, patented
technology.58
Nonetheless, monopolists will not be obliged to consult with such competent
market players, as mentioned above, for enhancing qualities ex ante via business
cooperation. As explained, a competitive market might diminish incentives to invest
in R&D, thus having a reduction in quality while at the same time encouraging
cooperation among market players. This concept holds true for the benefit of the
consumer in either quality or price factors.

5. Copying Preventing Costs
By obtaining the patent right, the innovator is less encouraged to protect his
innovation from being copied or reverse engineered. 59
Such protections are
commonly a cause for additional R&D costs among competitors, which in turn are
passed on to the consumer. 60 Moreover, such protections are a cause for extending
the R&D period, thereby delaying the time when society may enjoy the innovation. 61
Additionally, preventing inventors from patenting their innovations might
encourage them to look to the protection of trade secret law for protection. 62 Trade
secret law holds less incentive, from society's viewpoint, than patent law. 63 Because
the inventor avoids any duty of disclosure in trade secret law, knowledge is withheld
from potentially expanding the public domain. 64
An unfavorable outcome obtained by society, is that the inventor's practice of
protecting an invention as a trade secret raises R&D costs, which eventually will be
impressed upon the consumer. 65 Nonetheless, in some cases the inventor might
prefer addressing trade secret law, which can result in extending the protection term

5 See generally Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347,
348 (1967) (introducing the function of possessing property rights, including intellectual property
possessions); see also infra Part III (discussing incentives and protection of innovation).
58See infra Part IV.A; see also Feldman, supra note 1, at 400 (explaining the importance and
relationship of market power as it relates to both patent and antitrust law). See also the example at
infra Part IV.B.6.b.
59Andrew Beckerman-Radau, The Choice Between Patent Protection and Trade Secret
Protection: A Legal and Business Decision, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY 371, 398-99, 40102 (2002).
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 377 (explaining why some inventors will elect protection under trade secret law rather
than patent law).
63See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 494 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring).
64 Id
65See Beckerman-Radau, supra note 59, at 397-99 (discussing the costs of maintaining
secrecy).
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well beyond the patent monopoly. 66 This may draw away from the antitrust
standard, damage welfare in terms of quality, and prevent the innovation from the
public domain. 67

III. PATENT LAW PROTECTIONS: CAUSES AND RATIONALIZATIONS

A. Introduction
Patent law rights are justified as long as they enhance welfare, through
encouraging inventors to seek knowledge over the patent object, and implement
products embodying their knowledge 68
While the social value of the information exceeds its R&D costs, the benefit to
the developer will be less than the benefit to society. 69 This leads to the developer
selling to fewer consumers, as the embodiment of the information could be cheaply
copied. 70 Simultaneously inventors are stimulated to produce innovations in short
time for public consumption and utilization, before the patent term will be over.71
Eventually, the innovation will enter the public domain, henceforth extending a
competitive market, naturally concluding with output growth, 72 and quality
enhancement.73

Id. at 383.
Id. at 383-84.
68 See infra Part III.B (discussing the social welfare justifications of patent law).
69 See Demsetz, supra note 57, at 348-49 (explaining the benefit of society under property
rights "the role of property rights in the internalization of externalities"); see also STEVEN SHAVELL,
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 138 (Belknap Press 2004) (discussing the social value
of information).
70 See SHAVELL, supra note 69, at 138. In exploring the social value of information, Shavell
explains that:
[i]f, however, information can be copied at low cost by those who come to possess
it, the person who first develops information will not be able to sell it to very
many buyers: Most buyers will be able to disseminate or resell the information
themselves.
Id. As a consequence, the reward to a person who creates
information will tend to be less, perhaps substantially less, than its social value.
Id.
71Peritz, supra note 2, at 6 (explaining that the twenty-year patent term "puts a cap on the
private right to exploit the patent, adding a sense of urgency to the development process.").
72 See Feldman, supra note 1, at 400. "Patent rights are offered to induce inventions whose
creation and disclosure will benefit to society." Id. (emphasis added). This is accomplished by
seeking the entry of the innovation into public domain, through full disclosure while filing for
patent. Id.
73 See Jay Dratler, Trade Dress Protection for Product Configurations: Is there a Conflict with
Patent Policy? 24 AIPLA Q.J. 427, 438, 440 (1996) (emphasizing the importance of the full disclosure
element for the sake of enriching society with new information regarding the patent). All of those
outcomes are to be read as one cause which is derivative to the public domain provision and have
and lead to a joint venture.
66

67
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Given this assumption, which is used as a premise for this article, next is an
examination of the statutory means offered under patent law, and their effect on
social welfare.

B. Growth of Social Welfare
Stimulating innovators to produce goods embodying innovative knowledge they
possess, to wit, new solutions to present problems, enhances social welfare by
presenting advanced outputs, and improving quality (notwithstanding quality of life).
Before such stimulation, prior solutions to problems were less efficient than the
improvement disclosed by the inventor.74 In the long term, after the innovative
information enters public domain, society benefits from additional social
enhancement, in the form of price reduction in a competitive market. 75
Validation of the above presumption is found by studying the U.S. Constitution,
justifying the patent system (as well as other IP regimes) as a way to "promote the
progress of science" which indicates the need and desire for expanding global
knowledge. 76 To wit, the privilege granted by patent law should be designed to
implement and achieve the above goal, as well interpreted, inasmuch as widening the
public domain around the patent.7 7
In the supply and demand model, this article refers to social welfare
enhancement, as a growth of the economic surplus, and/or preservation or
enlargement of the consumer surplus.78 Such improvement will take place whenever
the supply and demand graph moves down-right, thus the equilibrium obtained
manifests lower prices and higher quantities. 79

C. Interaction with Market Functioning
As will be explored further on, due to the immense interaction patents have with
various market functions, there should be no dichotomy between patent law
privileges and the law which is in trust with commerce efficiency. 8 0
Patent law privileges patentees in a manner of jus in rem, in the sense of a
negative right that provides exclusivity. 81 Likewise, intellectual property rights

74If the presumption laid down here is false, meaning there is no elastically descending
demand curve, the innovator, in the first place, will not be encouraged to produce.
7 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (requiring - the "disclosure" and "enablement" requirements
for filing a patent in order to enable other researchers to study the patent and know-how). This
required disclosure, eventually allows other manufacturers to produce their own goods embodying
the information after the patent expires, by that enhancing the consumers' surplus. See also Figure.
4 below, and infra Part V.
76 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
77Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974).
78See Figure 3 and Figure 4.
7T Katz, supra note 55, at 868.
80 See infra Part V.
81 Beckerman-Rodau, spant59at387; 35 U.S.C. § 154(a).
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("IPRs") generate a positive market power.82 In this context, IPRs provide exclusivity
to a single market player, which results in marketing a product embodying
innovative information at prices higher than marginal costs. 83 This results in a less
efficient economic balance,84 thus negatively influencing market consumption. 85
In sum, patent law is doomed to interact with the market performance, within
the limits of the statutory boundaries that are meant to keep market performance in
order. Accordingly it is apparent that patent rights, as explained above, should not
be broadened over other commercial legal aspects, including the antitrust standards,
but instead, should be amenable to the market normative framework and delimitate
only inasmuch necessary for encouraging inventors. 86

D. Economic Rationalization
In the manner of the conclusion expressed in the last Part, it should be
emphasized that patents are nevertheless the means aimed to enhance welfare, and
not the main object. Therefore, patent law should be used only in order to accomplish
as such-favoring society rather than the inventor's right for proprietary right to
information.
As mentioned above, the most intuitive reason for having patent law rights is to
support inventiveness.
By granting the inventor, or the primal possessor of
knowledge, exclusive rights over the marketing of the patentable innovation to come,
R&D costs will not become irrecoverable due to unfair competition by developers
which did not bear the same costs. If such unfair competition were allowed, it would
drive market prices of the innovation toward marginal costs, and prevent the first
inventor-investor to recoup its costs.87
By expecting high returns for its innovation, the inventor will be encouraged to
This act enhances social welfare. 89
produce and transform its information.8 8
Whereas if the innovator's expected ROI was subjectively low, it would not have
engaged in R&D in the first place. 90
Figure 1 has been provided below to show supply and demand of an article in a
reference frame of price vs. quantity. Due to the growth of supply in a specific
market, where improvements have been made, the supply graph moves from So to Si;
and the market's aggregate demand equilibrium, will be achieved (in short-medium

82Katz, supra note 55, at 841-43.
83 Id. at 851-53.
84 See infra Part IV.A and Figure 3, below.
85 Katz, supra note 55, at 856-57.
86Id. at 868. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the implications of patent law provisions
interfering with market efficiency).
87 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 13 (Harvard Univ. Press 2003) (noting the dynamic benefit of granting property
rights-the traditional economic explanation for intellectual property rights).
88See SHAVELL, supra note 69, at 138.
89Id. at 138-40, 143.
90 Katz, supra note 55, at 860.
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time range) with higher quantities and lower prices than before (the movement from
point 'a' towards 'b' on the DA graph above).91
Figure 1
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As shown below, in Figure 2, new innovations which are market-required and
have demand in the market should be examined with regard for their social values
which is the amount by which social welfare will rise. The optimal production level,
can be calculated by the area bounded by a product's market price valuation and the
production cost in the market demand quantity for that valuation. 92 Nonetheless,
any price or quantity combinations that will not produce the exact (rectangular) area
between the supply and demand curves in the limits of b to a, will not produce the
optimal social value optimal social value of consumption. 93
Figure 2
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92Thomas Humphrey, Marshallian Cross Diagrams and Their Uses Before Alfred Marshall:
The Origins of Supply and Demand Geometry, ECON. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 8, available at
http://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/economic-review/1992/pdf/er780201.pdf.
93 POSNER, supra note 6, at 16. Note that in this analysis, patented monopoly is not taken into
account. For further clarification over monopoly inefficiencies see Part IV.A.2 and Figure 3, below.
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Taking the preceding analysis into account, bearing in mind the convention laid
down in Part III.C, this article concludes by noting that any ignorance of the
economic model analysis, while granting exclusivity rights via patents, will harm
social welfare growth potential-the raison d'8tre of both commerce law and patent
law.

E. Summary
As explained previously, patent law was legislated to enhance social welfare, by
enabling society to utilize knowledge embodied by patents, eventually having the
knowledge enter the public domain and to be used freely-by creating a limited
monopoly. 94 Hence, claims for the lack of privilege (i.e., exclusivity rights), where the
social contribution is not justified, are not normally heard. However, both antitrust
law and patent law aim for the same goal: expanding outputs and improvements for
potential consumption. 95
First, this article sets and explains the perception by which the public domain is
expanded, and sets a differential standard. Second, this article examines the extent
of rights granted in terms of length (from a patent perspective, referring to time,
scope, usage, etc.) and breadth (from a patentee perspective, tying arrangements,
distribution limitations, etc.), and outlines an educated cost-efficient way of enforcing
such rights. Finally, this article weighs the socioeconomic state of the current patent
system.
This article examines whether the amount of harm imposed on the
consumer's surplus as a result of the patent monopoly (later refer to as the
"deadweight loss") is indeed necessary to incentivize for innovation.

94 Nicholas Economides & William Hebert, Patent and Antitrust: Application to Adjacent
Markets, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 455, 456 (2008).
95 Robert Pitofsky, Comnso ely
nItouto
oI
n
nirs,13
Sw. J.L. &
TRADE
AM.
257,
258
(2007),
available
at
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle hein.journals/sjltal3&div=17&g sent=1&collection journal
S.
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-LEXLATA

A. Part I.- Explanation

1. Competition Variables
This Part will focus on the impact of patent rights on competition variables,
which are ascribed to micro-economic analysis in a consumer market, as follows: (1)
outputs; (2) distribution; (3) pricing; (4) quality; (5) advancement; and (6)
manufacturers in the market.

a. GraphicalDisplay
According to Alfred Marshall's supply and demand model 97, market forces tend
to balance, under free-competition. This balancing occurs where all six competition
variables are at optimum level, in respect to producing social welfare, as shown below
in Figure 3, and Figure 4.
Figure 3
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Point (a') reflects the legitimate quantity and price variables in eyes of the
consumer's preference, in order to maximize the consumer's surplus. Alternatively,
point (a") reflects the legitimate quantity and price variables in the eyes of the
manufacturer's overall costs. While preserving free competition, both graphs meet at
the market's equilibrium point (a) meaning that the economic surplus-the dashed
96 An effective patent regime is that which provides full monopoly rights to the patentee (for
intellectual property rights relativism, see supra Part II, whether explicit or deducted, in order to

prevent others from replication in relation to trade and/or entitling damages whenever a patent
infringement occurs. Therefore, this article will refer to patent law rights as exclusive or monopoly
rights granted to the patentee. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006) (providing exclusivity regarding U.S.
patent law); ROBIN JACOB ET AL., A GUIDEBOOK TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 4 (Sweet & Maxwell

5th ed. 2004) (discussing exclusivity rights in relation to E.U. and U.K. law).
97 See generally Milton Friedman, The MarshallianDemand Curve, 57 J. POL. ECON. 463, 46467 (1949) (discussing methods of interpreting supply and demand curves to explain the relationship
between consumer surplus and market competition); Humphrey, supra note 92, at 8 (explaining
Marshallian curves in general).
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area-is maximized, and quantity and price variables are optimized under the
market's demand and supply constants.98

b. Tendencies in Restriction of Competition
By restricting competition around a certain product, the market bears higher
prices and fewer quantities of that product, diminishing the economic surplus. 99 In
other words, the manufacturer will produce fewer goods embodying the patented
information than the optimum (Qa) and set higher prices (Pa) than that which will
reduce consuming potential.1 00 Consequently, this shift in production will lessen the
ability for social advancement via adoption of the innovation.10 1
Take, for example, the selection of raw materials. A single manufacturer in a
non-competitive market will be less motivated to seek cheaper and longer lasting raw
materials, which will ultimately raise costs and retail prices. A manufacturer in a
non-competitive market, not fearing competition in the market, can take advantage
of delays in distribution, and will set its distribution array in a way which maximizes
personal gain. This means that all market segments will be covered only after a
certain time period (especially relevant to international patents) according to applied
marketing doctrines. 102
The patentee enjoys a wide (perhaps even absolute) range of the market share,
which not only gives an indication of its excessive market power, but also denies
others from entering the market.' 03
Aside from the supply and demand model, restriction of competition prevents
other manufacturers from using the patented technology and developing that
technology with more efficient manufacturing. 104 This is accomplished by producing
the product in a shorter time period than the patentee, and with more production
resources allowing a more efficient use of the technology.10 5 Thus, for the duration of
the patent term, the product embodying the invention will tend to remain of the same
quality and value as the patentee is able to produce in the first place, and will not
advance beyond the specific patentee's capabilities. 1 06
As opposed to a free-competition system where the consumer has the choice to
purchase an improved product, in order to maximize profits in the long run, the
monopolist (in this case, the patentee) can set a product's quality at a certain (low)

98See Humphrey, supra note 92, at 8.

9 See id.

See id.
id.
102See generally id. (discussing the social impact from various economic doctrines of supply an
demand).
103See e.g., Fisher' & Paykel Ltd. v. Commerce Comm'n 1990 2 NZLR 731 (HC) 760 (discussing
the importance of "entry barriers" in a competitive market).
104See Julie Turner, The Nonmanufacturing Patent Owner: Toward a Theory of Efficient
Infringement, 86 CAL. L. REV. 179, 202 (1998).
105 See id.
106 See id. at 195.
100

101 See
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level. 107 In summary, the advancement of the patented technology will therefore be
slowed in relation to advancement in a freely-competitive market, and such
advancement will be dictated by the monopolist.
Regarding the labor market, any anti-occupation or anti-competitive restraints,
reduces a manufacturer's potential to gain revenues by competing in a restricted field
that is part of the manufacturer's expertise.108 Where employees are skilled, any
exclusion from implementing their knowledge, by restraining them from engaging in
R&D, will lessen society's potential to benefit from such skill. This impact is relevant
to the labor market, yet it affects both employees and society. 109
When the output, distribution and market pricing variables together are
controlled by a certain individual, either de facto or in potential, that individual (in
this case, the patentee) enjoys an excessive amount of market power. 110 Therefore,
that individual produces at prices above marginal costs (at ((P(Q)a)) as described below
and in Figure 4)."'
For the context this article, the definition for the term 'market power', in
relation to the antitrust standard, is related to micro-economic studies, and in
general is: "the ability of a firm to set its prices above marginal cost."112
This article suggests that the patentee extensively maximizes its gains and
enjoys market power extensively by setting three market variables for its own
benefit: (1) the patentee will excessively set prices; (2) outputs will decrease; and (3)
distribution will take place according to the economic abilities of certain market
segments." 3 These market segments are the ones that can bear the established
price, not the ones based on societal needs. Thus, addressing having a single
manufacturer holding market power constitutes an inevitable deadweight loss over
the economic surplus, which is felt much more than the consumer's surplus.114

c. Holding Potential Competitors Out
Regarding all the aforementioned competition variables, an efficient patent
system has definite implications for potential competitors both inside and outside the
patent registry domain. 115 Regardless of whether competitors may be more efficient
than the patentee, the efficient patent system acts to lessen the competitors' ROI

107Josef Drex1, Real Knowledge is to Know the Extent of One's Own Ignorance: On the
Consumer Harm Approach in Innovation-Related Competition Cases, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 677, 695
n.68 (2010).
108See Turner, supra note 104, at 195, 202.
109 Id

110 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 87, at 378 (describing how price discrimination by
individuals seller may expand output).
111Id. at 378-79.
112Katz, supra note 55, at 882.

113See id. at 884-85, 887.
114 See

id. at 873.

115See generally LANDES & POSNER, supra note 87, at 295, 298-99 (discussing the potential for
competition under patent law as compared to other areas of IP law).
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expectancy by reducing incentive for interfering, improving, and generally competing
with the patentee.116

d. Competition's Contribution to Welfare
Validating technological progress and generating new products, where potential
consumer demand exists, constitutes a major factor in increasing social welfare and
the economic growth." 7
Welfare is directly influenced from the competition
variables, and any departure from their levels in a competitive market will have an
impact in the form of a deadweight loss. 118
Accordingly, statutory patent law rights harm competition variables, thus
disturbing the optimal equilibrium in the supply and demand model, which imposes
a deadweight loss upon the economic surplus. 119 This deadweight loss is illustrated
below in Figure 4.

2. Impacts on the Consumer's Surplus
Figure 4
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equilibrium has a higher quantity and lower price. Here, production is set, not by
the marginal revenue, but by demand meeting the marginal cost. 1 22 In other words,
under patent law, the manufacturer sees only its own revenue and costs, seeking
demand only to the point where the manufacturer's own gain is maximized. 123
Under free-competition, from the consumer's perspective, the manufacturer sees
both its costs and the market's demand and will continue to produce up to the
optimum amount (Qb), therefore maximizing the economic surplus. 124
The deadweight loss imposed on the economic surplus, by the analysis
previously made, regarding a non-competitive market is expressed by the area:
b.

[D(Q) -MC(Q)]dx.

125

a

While the deadweight loss of the consumers' surplus is expressed by the
rectangular area:
[P(Q)a - P(Q)b] X (Qb - Qa)

2
Therefore, the amount of social welfare lost, in terms of the above deadweight
loss, will be positive as long as: (1) the manufacturers' total production costs are in
direct proportion to the quantity produced; and (2) the market's demand is not
fixed. 126 These two assumptions will always be true while discussing a patentable
innovation.127
Moreover, even by assuming that in certain fields, such as where improvements
are necessary on a frequent basis, patent law can be pro-competitive in the short run,
due to its proprietary perspective. 128 Conversely, in the long run, it will tend to
reverse, and harm welfare by restricting innovation preoccupation. 129
It should now be clear that the monopolist has no incentive to produce above
what is necessary for maximizing its own gains, either in terms of higher quantity or
lower prices. However, the market's demand reaches equilibrium at a higher
quantity, it may still be economically worthwhile to achieve from the manufacturer's
point of view (at point ((b), in Figure 4). Hence, outputs under patent rights (at (Qb)

122Id.

at 11.

123The conditions for maximum gain are: (i) MR(Qa) - MC(Qa) = 0; (ii) 8[MR(Qa)] -8[MC(Qa)] < 0.
The amount "Qa" (under monopoly) will now meet the demand and balance with the price "P(Qa)."
124The economics' surplus is expressed by the integral 'f[D(Q) - MC(Q)]dx. Where (b) is the

break-even of a free-competition market in the manufacturer's perspective.
125See Danny Ben-Shahar & Assaf Jacob, A Preach for a Breach: Promoting Copyright
Infringement as an Optimal Monopolistic Behavior 16 (Interdisciplinary Ctr. Herzliya, Working
Paper, 2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=240908.
126Id. at 15; POSNER, supra note 6, at 80.
127 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (2006) (inferring that the innovator is bound to have positive R&D

costs, and the consumer will accordingly have a descending demand graph due to the patentability
requirements that these sections establish).
128Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust, Intellectual Property and Standard Setting Organizations, 90
CAL. L. REV. 1889, 1938 (2002).
129 Id.
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in Figure 4) will not express the optimal social value of the patent, 1 30 and thus the
potential social welfare achieved under free-competition will not be realized. 131
In conclusion, under micro-economic studies, monopolists impose a deadweight
loss on the economic surplus, which in turn reduces outputs to a level below the
market's demand.

B. Part II.- The Economic Problem

1. Social Damage
As shown above, the monopoly privilege drawn from the current patent system
imposes a burden on society.
This monopoly is manifested by altering the
competition variables' free market values, but the obvious damage is that consumers
pay more and yet receive less quantity. 132 This is even more evident in dealing with
essential facilities, 133 where the impact can be substantially critical: the patentee
sees a less elastic demand graph, so it will reduce outputs with correspondingly high
prices, thus amplifying the deadweight loss. 134
A possible scenario occurs in an idiosyncratic market created by the innovative
product itself. Here, this could happen with a new product without existing
commercial use. For example, think of a new medical product for personal use, which
until now was only used by medical staff. Thus, the patent system constitutes an
efficient over-protection, which improperly balances the consumer's burden and the
manufacturer's incentive. 135 Summing up this point, the inventor enjoys a statutory
incentive far greater than it should have had in order to bring its product to market.
This increases the deadweight loss and imposes a larger burden on the consumer's
surplus than if the incentive would have been less significant, yet powerful enough to
encourage R&D.

2. Market Power Disaster
This Part discusses the conventional economic explanation for the social damage
mentioned above, which derived into the term 'market power.' Market power can

130 LANDES & POSNER,

supra note 87, at 300.
Illoong Kwon, Patent Portfolio Race and Secrecy (forthcoming), available at
http://plaza4.snu.ac.kr/~ilkwon/Research/Secrecy.pdf (noting that social welfare in this sense, is
expressed by the economic surplus).
132 See POSNER, supra note 6, at 197-98 (indicating that a contrasting point of view suggests
that patents are not a solemn monopoly agent, in the antitrust ses)
133 Cyril Ritter, Refusal to Deal and Essential Facilities: Does Intellectual Property Require
Special Deference Compared to Tangible Property?, 28 WORLD COMPETITION L. & ECON. REV. 281,
288 (2005).
134 See POSNER, supra note 6, at 11-12.
135 See Ritter, supra note 133, at 293-94.
131 See
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damage social welfare by the deadweight loss it imposes. 1 36 By possessing patent
rights, the patentee may be able to generate an excessive amount of market power,
due to the nature of the product. 137
Generating innovations is a very important element of social welfare.138
Therefore, patentees should enjoy a positive amount of market power. 139 However,
the same power granted by the current IP regime leads to inevitable social damage,
caused by deadweight loss. 1 40 Due to the existence of market power, consumers will
eventually consume less of the product embodying an invention, than the
optimum. 141
One explanation for the conclusion above is that the current patent system
favors proprietary criteria above the economic factor, inasmuch as the surplus loss is
not affected by the amount of the market power possessed. 142 Thus, damage to social
welfare will manifest as a deadweight loss at its full potential. 143 This explanation
assumes that the patentee has substantial market power and calculates its prices
based on marginal costs alone. 144

3. How the Absence of Intellectual Property Rights Affects Welfare

a. Optimum Demand us. Optimum Supply
Once patented goods have been released into the public domain, the supply and
demand model equilibrium in the specific market will tend to seek the optimal social
value area (as shown in Figure 2), thus the economic surplus will be maximized (as
described by point (b) at Figure 4) in relation to public welfare and consumption.
Still, one cannot ignore the fact that by not granting the right incentive and
privileging the inventor above others, entrepreneurs will ex ante expect a return not
less than their production costs, and less than the optimal social value price (in

136Katz, supra note 55, at 885-86.
137See Ritter, supra note 133, at 292 (explaining that a patent holder may be so successful
during the term of protection that his return far exceeds what would have been necessary to reward
and encourage the innovation. This may be due to the fact that the product creates its own market,
or wipes out competitors in an existing market either because it is genuinely superior to rival
products or because it owes its dominance to peculiar market forces such as network effects or
switching costs/learning effects).
138See id. at 290.

139See POSNER, supra note 6, at 195 (noting that in this context the discussion of substantial
market power, can be referred to as "monopoly power").
140 Katz, supra note 55, at 904-06.
141 SHAVELL, supra note 69, at 222 (explaining that because firms with market power will set
prices higher than unit costs, customers will purchase less than they would in a perfectly
competitive market setting).
142See infra Part IV.
143A. Mitchell Polinsky & William P. Rogerson, Products Liability, Consumer Misperceptions,

and Market Power, 14 BELL J. ECON. 581-83 (1983).
144Katz, supra note 55, at 854.
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Figure 2 it is shown as the amount of [a - b] per unit), which will not encourage
production to the optimum level. 145

b. Two-tier Monopoly
The monopoly offered by patent law leads to a reduction of the competition
around the patent in two ways: (1) the first being a de facto monopoly innate to the
patented invention itself; and (2) a second being a de jure monopoly derived from the
exclusivity right granted to the patent.146
Therefore, not only does the invention itself demand high resources to be
reproduced by others, 147 but the manufacturer will proactively act to restrict any
reproduction of its product. 148 Accordingly one can consider the de facto monopoly, as
a quasi-property right inherent in the innovation itself which is likely to achieve the
similar outcome of by law IPRs. 149 This inherent term can be either a greater or
shorter time period than a legal grant of rights. In this context, most inventions
enjoy some measure of a de facto monopoly even without granting IPR by law.

4. Setbacks to Implementation of Knowledge
The patentee is free to delay the embodiment of its patent for revenue
considerations, such as market segmentation and distribution, advancing its product
to a certain level during the lifetime of the patent. 15 0 As long as the patentee is not
entering the patent misuse boundaries (for a review regarding the 'patent misuse'
doctrine and its association with empowering the antitrust standard over patent law,
see Part IV.B.5 below), the patentee will enjoy full protection without concern for the
potential infringement by its opponents.
In contrast to the above mentioned
privilege, stands the very heart of competition ratifications, as laid down in this

145See supra Part III.D.
146Nicolas Boccard, Natural Monopoly and Regulation 3-4, 8 (May 2010)

(unpublished

manuscript) (on file with the University of Giorna, Department of Economics), available at
http://www3.udg.edu/fcee/professors/nboccard/micro2/part2/MonoReg.pdf.
147 Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property Policy, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 534, 545-46, 548 (2003) (noting that non-infringing use does not mean free access, as the
process of translating object code to source code can be quite expensive and time consuming).
148See, e.g. Ignazio Musu, Intellectual Property Rights and Biotechnology: How to Improve the
Present Patent System 2, 11 (FEEM, Working Paper No. 83.05, 2006), available at
http://www.feem.it/userfiles/attach/Publication/NDL2005/NDL2005-083.pdf (explaining that holder
of an intellectual property right has a power of exclusion which limits access by others to the newly
produced knowledge).
149Mark R. Patterson, Inventions, Industry Standards, and Intellectual Property, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1043, 1073-74 (2002).
150 See Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92 CORNELL L.
REV. 1065, 1075-76 (2007). See also infra Part IV.A.1, detailing competition variables nos. 1, 2 and 5
-Output, Distributionand Advancement, respectively.
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article-to stimulate innovators to ameliorate society with their knowledge,
efficiently to all market segments, as quickly as possible. 15 1
Furthermore the patentee is free to hinder others by expanding the basic patent
entitlement, while other manufacturers are trying to imitate the product's intention
or solution algorithm by reverse engineering. 152 Thus, access to public domain is
again being limited. 153 Such behavior affects the market, while moving towards a
global scope of intellectual property protection. 154
In certain fields, such as pharmaceutical and biotechnology studies, where
patents are considered to be subjectively important to attract investors, researchers
may be excluded from innovating around a patent, and therefore lack incentive to
research a specific issue. 155 This immensely increases the 'set-back' of implementing
researchers' knowledge, giving the patentee a way for legally broadening the scope of
its patent. 156
Another 'set-back' can be in virtue of situations by which the possessor of the
information is protected by two sets of intellectual property rules, such as patent law
and copyright law (e.g. computer software). Accordingly, the information will be
distantly kept away from the public domain. This type of dual regulation over the
access to the information will effectively deter others from implementing and
integrating their own knowledge with the protected information. 15 7 'Setting-back'
implementation of innovative information and restricting outputs, is not only
disastrous to social welfare, but also contradicts the patent law ideals that are
unified with antitrust law. 158

a. Overuse us. Underuse of Property
Turning now to discuss a specific proposition, this article will explain how IPR
results in 'setting-back' the implementation of a patent by not offering the innovator
with motivation to use its knowledge in the optimal way.

151 See id. at 1075 (noting that by waiting an additional year before making a decision to
initiate the development process, a patentee loses a year of potential profits but gains the possibility
of greater certainty about the potential profitability of commercialization).
152 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974).
153 Id. (indicating that when the innovator is concerned with reverse engineering, he might
avoid applying for patent in the first place); see SHAVELL, supra note 69, at 150 (using Coca-Cola as
a example to explain why not patenting an invention intensifies, thus intensifying the limitation
over public access to knowledge, even after the time period of the patented has been extended).
154 Peter Drahos, An Alternative Framework for the Global Regulation of Intellectual Property
Rights
6,
27-28
(CGKD,
Working
Paper
No.
1,
2005),
available
at
http://cgkd.anu.edu.au/menus/publications.php.
155 Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg,

Can Patents Deter Innovation?

Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SC. 698, 700 (1998).
1T6Id.
157

Weiser, supra note 147, at 538-40.

158 See supra Part IIE.

The
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As a contraposition to Garrett Hardin's tragedy of the commons metaphor, 1 59
this article introduces an argument concerning property underuse and the
diminution of the public domain-access to public domain should be strictly
regulated in order to avoid overuse of property. 160 Hardin's metaphor illustrates that
where the marginal cost of accessing the public domain exceeds the benefit of
expanding it, and one's considerations will not benefit the whole. 1 61 Conversely,
access to public domain should be strictly regulated in order to avoid overuse of
property-stands an argument concerning property underuse and the tragedy of the
anti-commons occurs whenever an individual possesses rights to exclude others from
using property significant to society (or intellectual property, for our concern). 1 62
Michael Heller, in his article, favorably claims a property regime that allows multiple
owners to use and to acquire ownership over the protected property, which might
prove more efficient than in a state of a single owner. 163
This article presumes that intellectual property is a scarce resource, compelling
society to motivate its possessors so they will have incentive to engage in R&D. 1 64
However, excessive rights, granted to the patentee prevents the patentee from acting
optimally in using its knowledge, as much as it prevents others, which may be more
efficient, from using the knowledge or cooperating with the patent owner. 165 This
presumption creates an inevitable allocative inefficiency paradigm. 1 66 In return, this
causes an underutilization of knowledge, impeding rather than promoting production
and ameliorations. 167
Information underutilization is compounded by false patent applications, which
delay implementation by others, presumably aggravated due to the low cost of patent
filing. 168 As will be explained in Part IV.C.1.a, moving towards a liability rule, rather
than a strict property rule, may help to avert any setback of knowledge
implementation, thus reducing any underuse of the patented information.

b. Output Control
One of the negative effects of IPR on consumption is that as patentees are able
to increase costs that exceed the market's optimum demand prices. 1 69 As shown
above, patented products will be marketed above their production costs beyond the

159Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SC. 1243, 1244 (1968), available at
http://www.sciencemag.org/content/162/3859/1243.full.pdfsid=b31527d9-44cf-40f3-9bl72ddd4be7efc7.
160Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of Anti-Commons: Property in the Transition from Marx to
Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 626 (1998).
161Hardin, supra note 159, at 1244.
162Heller, supra note 160, at 626.
163Id. at 673-74.
164
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 87, at 374.
165Heller, supra note 160, at 626, 677.
166Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 155, at 700.
167Musu, supra note 148, at 10.
168 JACOB, supra note 96, at 40.
169SHAVELL, supra note 69, at 142
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socially optimal pricing, thus consumers who do not value the
optimal social value will not purchase it. 170 The social welfare
difference between production costs and the selling price,
determined by the patentee. 171 In other words, the portion of
the exclusive hands of the patentee. 172

394

product more than its
damage is equal to the
which is exclusively
consumption loss is in

5. Patent Misuse
Patentees commonly wish to expand their patent by the use of contract. In this
manner, the patentee can enjoy revenues from complementary goods it is selling, or
by royalties from the patent. 173 Such course of action, binding the purchase of both
the patentable product and its complementary products, often through
goods-to-be-sold contracts, allows the patentee to tie-in its patent rights with a
product that did not receive any de jure rights. Therefore, certain mechanisms have
been amended to patent law, such as the patent misuse doctrine, 1 74 that aim to deny
the patentee from using de jure rights in a way that can harm social welfare and
increase the deadweight loss. However, as will be explained, these legal tools may
not be efficient enough in keeping the antitrust standard.
Tying-in is a direct derivative, and probably the most common market control
practice, of patent misuse, which strengthens and effectively encourages the
inefficiency of patent protection. 175 In the guiding precedent, Morton Salt,1 76 an
attempt was made to expand the monopoly limits granted to a patentee. The
respondent, a manufacturer of a salt tablet depositing machines, made use of tying-in
practice by obligating its buyers, to purchase its unpatented salt tablets. 177 Even so,
the U.S. Supreme Court did not rule in favor of the petitioner, on the grounds of
contradiction to public policy to resolve the dispute under discussion via the legal
frame of antitrust law. 178 The Court dismissed the necessity for discussion of
antitrust directives, and did not find a Clayton Act violation for exclusive dealing
arrangements. 179
In other words, patent misuse does not have to render
infringement of antitrust law. 180 However, patent misuse occurs whenever the
manufacturer improperly tries to extend the patent scope or time period. 181
The Court ruled that the use of a patent, for the purpose of restraining
competition in the marketing of an unpatented product, will not be immunized by
patent law, however a manufacturer producing complementary goods, for example,
170 Id.
171 See id.
172 See Figure 2.
173 See POSNER, supra note 6, at 198.
174 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2006).
175 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 87, at 372-73.

176 Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492-93 (1942).
at 490.
Id. at 494.
1709Td.
180 Feldman, supra note 1, at 409.
181 Id. at 413-12.
177 Id.
178
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will not be disqualified from trading in the same market. 1 82 Thus Morton Salt
presents the reader with the inadequacy of antitrust law regarding using patents to
prevent competition around the patent, inasmuch as the Clayton Act prohibits
contractual agreements in restraining trade, and will not produce any cause of
action.183

Summarizing, one can see that the legal analysis courts use for patent misuse
cases not only explicitly disregards the antitrust standard, but by not applying it over
patent law and its social welfare protection mechanisms, 1 84 the Court ended up
addressing patent law's directives on their own. 185

a. Compulsory Licensing
Compulsory licensing is another counter measure for patent misuses, 186 which is
often viewed as reducing innovation incentive. 187 This practice is disputed amongst
scholars, with respect to impacting incentives to innovate. Although compulsory
licensing reduces the ROI, 188 it does not necessarily inflict a direct reduction of a
manufacturer's incentive to produce, nor does it significantly impact incentives to
research and produce. 189 Furthermore, some commentators may speak of compulsory
licensing as promoting (or at least having a neutral effect) inventors' incentives to
invest in R&D. 190
Reviewing U.K. law, the 1977 Patents Act ("P.A. 1977") encourages patentees to
release commercial rights, in the form of licensing contracts. 191 This is beneficial to
the patentee because it does not cause the original patentee serious inferiority effect
since in most situations, it sets the license terms. 1 92 . This statutory encouragement
has the patentee voluntarily waive its monopoly rights, for both the social welfare
182Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 491. Chief Justice Stone interprets the monopoly given by patent
law by noting that: "A patent operates to create and grant to the patentee an exclusive right to
make, use and vend the particular device described and claimed in the patent. But a patent affords
no immunity for a monopoly not within the grant. . . ." Id. (emphasis added).
183 Id. at 494.
184Robin C. Feldman, Should We Breathe Life into Patent Misuse? 9-10 (Jan. 8, 2003)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/bcltIPSC_2003_Feldman.pdf.
185 Id. at 15.
186See THOMAS TERRELL, TERRELL ON THE LAW OF PATENTS § 9.06 (David Young et al., 14th
ed. 1994) (noting that some forms of patent misuse include Either stipulating patent rights by
requiring actual performance, or denying or limiting the patent after it has been granted).
187Ritter, supra note 133, at 298.
18 Id. at 294.
189 Id.
190 See, e.g., Jonathan Baker, Promoting Innovation Competition Through the Aspen/Kodak
Rule, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 495, 514 (1999). "[I]t is unlikely that the dominant firm's innovation
incentive would decline substantially as a consequence of antitrust enforcement ..
"Id. (emphasis
added).
191 Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, § 46(3)(d) (Eng.) [hereinafter P.A. 1977] (reducing patent renewal
fees by half). U.K. Patent Law, addresses patent misuse in forms of "abuse of monopoly." Id.
192 TERRELL, supra note 186, § 9.57. However, in some situations, the license terms will be set
objectively by the Comptroller. Id.
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interest in promoting innovation, and for receiving compensation over time for
resources already spent. In this context, U.K. law intertwines competition rationales
with patent rights since section 51 of P.A. 1977,193 and section 81 of the 1998
Competition Act, 194 jointly allow both the Comptroller, and the Competition
Commission to examine the patent in order to seek the public interest. 195
In addition, the Comptroller has power, independent of the patentee, to release
the patent for the use of other manufacturers, by linking them to the original
patentee by contract. In this situation the intervention of the Comptroller will not
cancel the patent by whole, but downgrade it by enabling others to be entitled to
obtain commercial license under the patent. 196

6. Price Discrimination

a. Definition
In a monopoly, the patentee is able to discriminate in prices as a market control
practice. 197 The patentee accomplishes this by specifying market segments and
having accustomed pricing policy which will eventually exclude other segments from
consuming innovative products due to a lack of resources. 198 Accordingly, those
segments will endure a reduction of their consumer surplus. 199
As one of the antitrust standard's cornerstones, section 2(a) of the Clayton Act
prohibits a single manufacturer to control the market by virtue of price
discrimination. 200
The Clayton Act constitutes prohibitions of de facto price
differential which may consist of a prima facie injury to the competition, by scales of
a reasonable probability. 201 The burden to rebut any such prima facie case, while a
substantive price differential exists, is on the allegedly discriminating party, who
must show that prices were lowered (or not raised) in order to "meet competition" in
"good faith," according to section 2(b) of the Clayton Act. 202

193P.A. 1977, c. 37,

§ 51.
194Competition Act, 1998, c. 41, § 18 (Eng.).
195TERRELL, supra note 186, § 9.57.
196P.A. 1977, c. 37, § 48. This move is referred as "licenses of right."
197See, e.g., Chang-Fa Lo, Potential Conflict Between TRIPS and GATT Concerning Parallel
Importation of Drugs and Possible Solution to Prevent Undesirable Market Segmentation, 66 FOOD
DRUG L.J. 73, 73 (2011) (explaining how price discrimination, in the context of parallel importation,
can help control the market in specific market segmentations, using patented drugs as an example).
198 Id.
199 Richard A. Posner, Vertical Restraints and Antitrust Policy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 229, 235-36
(2005).
200 Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730, § 2(a) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)).
201FallS City Indus., Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U.S. 428, 431, 434-35 (1983).
202 Id. at 431; 15 U.S.C. § 13(b).

[11:367 2011]
Patent Law in the Antitrust Scope:
Between Social Advancement and Competition Impingement

397

b. The Patent Law Attitude
Patent law effectively ignores the antitrust standard's price discrimination
taboo, by granting lawful monopoly rights. 203 Via patent law, the patentee is able to
set prices, regardless of competition considerations, thus crucially excluding certain
market segments. 204 To demonstrate price discrimination via patents, consider the
following scenario:
Assume John holds a patent over a non-invasive glucose monitor, while
Jayne sells standard invasive glucose monitoring kit for ten dollars,
supplying 100% of the demand in her city. John sets the price for his noninvasive product at forty dollars, supplying twenty-five percent of the
demand. Depending on the demand elasticity, this arrangement tends for
the worse while speaking of luxury and substitute goods which possess
consumer's necessity. 205
Consequently, in this scenario, at least seventy-five percent of the market will
not benefit from the amelioration, and continue monitoring its glucose level, via
Jayne's classic meter. A legitimate competition injury resulted by harming welfare
regarding the advancement of the competition variables.

c. The Antitrust Law Attitude
The revisions made by the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936,206 which amended the
Clayton Act, declared the use of a price discrimination marketing methods unlawful,
while an impairment of primary or secondary line competition was being
manifested, 207 as long as there was a relationship between different purchasers. 208
The prohibition was judicially interpreted to associate with the seller and its
competitors rather than the purchaser. 209
The Supreme Court concluded that price discrimination, alone, does not rise to
the level of a flat prohibition of price differentials, inasmuch as price differences
constitute but one element of a section 2(a) violation.21 0
However, price
discrimination is illegal when it is conditioned on a relationship as mentioned above,
which in effect lessens competition in any line of commerce. 211
203 Katz, supra note 55, at 840-41.
204 See supra Part IV.B.4.b.
205 Katz, supra note 55, at 883-84.
206 Anti-Price Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 74-692, 49 Stat. 1526 (codified as amended at 15

U.S.C. § 13).
207 Federal Trade Commn v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S 536, 543-44 (1960). Even if the
impairment applies individually to one of the competition line, or one of them combined with the
tertiary line, distribution geographically or demographically meaning.
208 Id. at 545.
209 Id. at 546.
2
10 Id. at 550, 553.
211Id. at 550.
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d. For-Profitand Not-for-Profit Firms
This Part examines the implications of price discrimination in the not-for-profit
sector. There is a clear difference between for-profit and not-for-profit firms, in terms
of permissions and restrictions. The former is banned from engaging in cartelization,
while the latter, in special circumstances and condition precedents which enables
efficiency by cartelization formation, is normally not banned. 212
Not-for-profit organizations may choose to cartel for reasons other than
maximizing outputs, without violating their mission for being a not-for-profit
organization.2 1 3 However, this may result by worsening the negative influences of
their monopoly, and thereby diminishing the (overall) output of the market, which
may ultimately damage welfare, unlike for-profit organizations which do not control
market prices.
In sum, not-for-profit monopolies may eventually engage in price discrimination
due to enhanced gains expected under such a competitive market. 214

e. Implications on Patent Rights
Next, this article analogizes its findings from the previous section, to explore
what inefficient outcomes the ability to discriminate in prices might have over social
welfare. 2 15 Below are a few scenarios that explain the possible outcomes as follows:
1. A single manufacturer will be free to engage in price discrimination
commerce aimed to enhance profits on the expense of the economic surplus,
especially of low income market segments. 216
2. In order to increase revenues, we can expect the innovator to draw many
resources in order to gain monopoly (e.g., in the preliminary stage, to attain
patent), resources which will delay manufacturing and increase retail
prices, so the manufacturer must turn to market segments which can bear
those costs.

212 POSNER, supra note 6, at 84. Furthermore, on the aspects that the mixture of for-profit and
not-for-profit firms in the same market (e.g. cultural centers, and medical organizations) (in the U.S.
for this matter)) has an impact on the market's economy and efficiency, by venturing in specific
cartels. Id. Even so, there is no antitrust law exemption for not-for-profit organizations that are
trying to diminish competition in favor of raising revenues alone. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984).
213 See Tomas J. Philipson & Richard A. Posner, Antitrust and the Not-For-Profit Sector § 2,
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 8126, 2001) available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl2132.pdf (indicating that the commercial intention for forming nonprofit organizations, presumably, aside from enjoining taxation exemptions, will be to maximize
outputs rather than maximizing cash flows).
214 POSNER, supra note 18, at 85 (explaining that even if the overall output may be lesser
opposed to a uniformed price commerce).
215 See Philipson, supra note 213, § 5.
216 POSNER, supra note 6, at 9.
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3. Non-designated market segments will be denied from consuming the
product, and the overall output of the new product will be reduced already
in the distribution stage. 217
4. Production costs that exceed the competitive equilibrium will limit
consumption in a way that the retail price consumers pay will not reflect
the product's utility, thereby not creating disposable income for buying the
product. 218
As a result, patented goods bear price and quantity below the equilibrium level,
which in effect increases the deadweight loss absorbed by society. 2 19 With respect to
not-for-profit inventions, inventions (such as academic advances), the same problem
of collusion arises, thus reducing outputs and denying access to knowledge. 220
By allowing patentees to participate in price discrimination, the optimal
equilibrium in the supply and demand model, and the economic surplus confined by
it, is not achieved. 221 Yet, it is very likely that the patent system does not bestow the
optimal protection which incentivizes production and perhaps opposes the
competitive market. 222

C. PartIII: Exclusivuty Damage

1. Infringement Accusation-On What Grounds?

a. Introducing: Liability Rules
Primarily, this Part will avoid demonstrating the differences between property
rule and liability rule regimes, 223 instead, this section will explain why it is more
efficient, in the manner of social welfare, to grant patent rights that come from
property rules, although these rules are less effective in protecting the possessor of
the knowledge. 224
217 See Lo, supra note 197, at 73, 75.
218 See SHAVELL, supra note 69, at 138.
219 F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, The Basic Matter: At the Periphery of Intellectual
Property, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 174, 180 (2004).
220 See Philipson, supra note 213, § 2.5.
221 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 87, at 378.
222 In a competitive market, the sum of all market segments, according to the manufacturers
allotting by price differentials, will be higher than the sum of all potential customers, unified.
223 For further understanding of the meaning "property rule" and "liability rule" see Guido
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of
the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1089 (1972); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules
Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 713 (1996).
224 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 87, at 12 (noting that the main reason for granting any
property rights over an asset is to reduce transaction costs so that parties an engage in commerce
over that asset, and form contracts about it).
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For supporting this concept, this article looks over possible scenarios involving
two parties arguing for the rights over a certain intellectual property, with one of
them enjoying exclusivity, and an entitlement to injunctive relief against the other.

b. Property Rules us. Liability Rules
When will society want to limit rights of a prior innovator and allow a
subsequent innovator, by law, rights to engage in the market of the prior innovator?
This would allow virtual infringement of any patent given to the prior innovator. In
effort to understand intellectual property conflicts in a commerce context, four
situations are presented as follows:
1. When parties do not bargain 225
(a) If the deadweight loss, by denying competition around the information
through subsequent innovators, and the prior inventor's expected ROI are
known, and the state is willing to pay full compensation to the prior
innovator for breach of its rights, under a property rule society will achieve
the optimal social outcome. 226
(b) Yet, because the abovementioned losses are not known and cannot be
calculated in advance, information possessed by the state is not perfect. It
is reasonable that the state knows both the costs of preventing any
infringement (such as enforcement costs, and litigation costs), and the
distribution of harm between the prior innovator and the infringer. 227
Accordingly, with respect to a single innovator who does not participate and does
not engage in commercial relations with its competitors, it will be more efficient to
deal with the infringer by a rule of liability. 228 Thus, social welfare will result closer
to the optimal point under a liability rule rather than under property rule. 229
2. When parties do bargain 230

225 One
innovator holds knowledge, and avoids from participating others (i.e.,
manufacturers/researchers, etc.). Hence, the prior inventor seeks to file a patent in order to be
granted exclusivity, both for eliminating the possibility of competition, more efficiency,
entrepreneurs, and before another innovator files a patent over the same subject, denying the
previous from engaging in the patent subject.
226 Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 223, at 724-25.
227 d. at 776, (referring t0 factors respectively 'c and 'h').
228
Id. at 760-61.
229 Id. at 725.
230 While for some reasons, such as geographic proximity, after the innovator has filed a
patent, (and completed registration under the disclosure requirement) and his opponent, an
entrepreneur in the same or similar/close field of expertise, develops commercial relations with him
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In this scenario, the subsequent innovator will not be occupied with the patent
by breaching the prior innovator's rights, yet will study the patent with its
professional knowledge from a close profession.
(a) As a particular implementation of the Coase Theorem, 231 regardless of
the intellectual property regime present, and under the assumption of
perfect information between the parties, whether the bargaining succeeds,
the outcome will always be Pareto effective. 232
Unfortunately, between parties lies both cognitive and attribution biases,
suggesting that people consistently and systematically overestimate their
assets, meaning that bargaining between a patent holder and a
complementary patent holder and a rival, is likely to fail. 233
(b) However, in the case that the parties have not reached bargain with
mutual benefit, the result will subjectively be superior to a result under a
property rule as liability rule tends to be superior while encountering
imperfect bargaining. 234
Therefore, a property rule-based patent law will not produce the most efficient
outcome in the sense of welfare where parties do not strike mutually beneficial
bargaining between themselves.

D. Summary
In general, one sees that by applying liability rules over patent law, social
welfare will, at least, tend to optimize through both increasing the potential for
justified cooperation, and by allowing efficient infringement to occur. 235 Liability
rules do not subject infringement to taboo even while classifying them as a breach,
thus encouraging efficient subsequent innovators to act. Moreover, under liability
rule, parties are motivated to engage in commercial relations, and bargain, in case of
a potential breach of the prior innovator's rights. It can now be understood that even
among those opposing the "efficient breach" establishment, 236 under property rules,
patent infringement will result in an inferior outcome to liability rules.
in connection with his patentable rights (e.g. as for licensing, or transferring full rights, etc.), rather
than breach his rights under the patent and be called an infringer.
231 See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 6, 8 (1960).
232 Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 223, at 733.
233 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 155, at 701.
234 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 223, at 735-36 (1996).
235 Id. at 785 (insisting that liability rules are superior to property rules, both in the obvius
situation where parties do not bargain, and in the not so obvious situation, where parties do
bargain, but under liability rule the expectancy of social welfare increases).
236 For further explanation on "efficient breach," which can describe the exact logic behind the
previous analysis, see Polinsky A. Mitchell, Risk Sharing Through Breach of Contract Remedies, 12
J. L. STUD. 427, 427-29 (1983).
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It is now understood, even among those opposing the "efficient breach" concept
that under property rules, patent infringement will result in an inferior outcome to
liability rules. 237 The fact remains that commercial use survives transaction costs,
and imperfect information.2 38 Ultimately, that may jeopardize the probability that
inventors will grant competitors access to patented knowledge, either by license or by
any other set of contract arrangement, even when it may be justified. 239

1. Anecdote for Developments in Biotechnology
In order to demonstrate this article's point of view, it shall briefly review patent
implications upon biotechnological developments.
In the context of therapeutic
innovations, such as drugs, it is evident that society not only benefits from
modernism, but it is also in need for such amelioration to be up-to-date with
evolution.2 40 However, enabling an inventor in the pharmaceutical field to attain
high amounts of market power constitutes a medical risk to society, resulting in:
reduction in consumption of innovation, 241 and lowering incentives to research and
develop. 242 All the more so, when high transaction costs are inherent to biomedical
and biotechnology research.2 43 Nevertheless, it is likely to presume bargaining
between researchers, for example when each holds a specific patent that can be
linked into a new discovery, will fail. 244
The problem has occurred in genetic engineering when researchers found
themselves restrained from practicing with a decoded gene or sequence. 245
Biomedical R&D in the U.S., federally supported, experienced a fluctuation towards
the private sector in 1980, which encouraged patents in that field and lessened public
access to the resultant research.246 Paradoxically, this shift discourages research and
innovation in the biotechnological field. 247 Thus, it may be interpreted that the
progression of quality in biotechnological studies is being denied. 248

See generally id. (describing "efficient breach").
238 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 155, at 700.
239 See Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property Policy, 103 COLUM.
L. REV. 534, 548-49 (2003).
240 See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 155, at 698-99.
241 This analysis is similar to our previously discussion, granting exclusivity to the inventor,
imposes a deadweight loss while outputs diminish and prices rise beyond the optimum equilibrium.
Id.
242 See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 155, at 700.
243 Id. at 701; Michal B. Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115, 189
(2003).
244 See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 155, at 700.
245 Id. at 699.
24T6Id
237

248 See Musu, supra note 148, at 11.
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V. COMPETITION RATIONALITIES-INTERSECTION WITH PATENT LAW

A. ConstitutionalAspects
From the eyes of the manufacturer, other than the patentee, the antitrust
standard is a constitutional and fundamental human right-the freedom of
occupation choice. 249 By now, scholars and courts are aware that there is no
dichotomy between the high standard granted to basic human rights, and the
safekeeping of the free competition principle. 250 While the latter is derived from the
former, competition is indeed protected in the extent of constitutional law-while
lawfully manifested by the antitrust standard. Hence, damaging or restricting the
right of free competition by law, in the context of a manufacturer requesting to
extend his activity to a certain field, have the relevant set of by constitutional
mandates related to human rights.
In this context reasons for granting
constitutional protection of free-competition, from the consumers' point of view,
embody the public interest for welfare via regulations, maintaining high quality
standards, reasonable prices and extensive distributional array. 251 In this context,
the reasons for granting constitutional protection of free-competition, from the
consumers' point of view, embodies the public interest for welfare via regulations,
keeping high quality standards, reasonable prices, extensive distributional array,
etc. 252

B. Economic Aspects
As previously discussed in Part IV, by allowing exclusivity rights, a patentee
diminishes outputs and raises prices, damaging potential social growth. Patent law
should be used only within the scope of a resource, aimed to achieve economic growth
and expand public domain. 253 Moreover, patent law and the economic implications of
commercial law in general, should be read together, having IPR defined under
commercial rationales. 254

249 Eyal Gross, How Free Competition Became a Constitutional Right?-In Minds of the Right
for Free Occupation, 23 TEL-AVIV L. REV. 229, 235 (2005) (relating to the competitive element, as
evolved through Israel Supreme Court rulings, and has expanded the prior perception, in the
context of the freedom of occupation choice, which was constituted only by the individuality
element).
250 Id. at 237.
251Id. at 255.
252 Id.
253 Weiser, supra note 239, at 550 (acknowledging the importance of a law re~gime whlich on the
one hand provides sufficient incentives for innovators, and from the other hand does not prevent
open access over knowledge).
254 Dratler, supra note 73, at 439 (noting that "intellectual property law is a part of economic
law, and the foundation of all economic law in the United States is the bedrock policy of free
competition").
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However, it is my opinion that the current link between patent law and
antitrust law, is not obvious nor understood whereas they each embody a particular
logic, by contrasting means, 255 as observed that the antitrust standard does not apply
to patents and patent rights.

C. Restrictions on Patent Law on Behalf of the Antitrust Standard
Patent advocates suggest that in order to incentivize innovations and avoid the
"problem of appropriability," patent law must override the antitrust standard, and
supply a dynamic prerogative. 256 That concept is significantly beneficial to the single
manufacturer, diminishing competition around it, by ensuring high standards of
property rights.
The main concern remains, however, that patent law and the courts will
eventually promote the means, which are used to motivate inventors through
bestowing patent rights, rather than their objective, which is to enhance welfare by
presenting innovations for consumption, expanding the public domain. 257 It is clear
enough that there are and should be "tradeoffs" between the advancement of
competition, and motivation of inventors via protection. 258 Though, finding the exact
balance is much more complicated than can be shown by graphical display, and such
a balance must be unambiguous. 259
Due to the vast effect that proprietary rights have on the economy,
appropriability in intellectual property can neither be achieved by patent law nor
antitrust law, by themselves. Thus, by determining the right amount of incentive, it
is important to take into consideration competition rationalities previously described
in Part V. This includes, the extent of damage that the patents can have on
constitutional rights of both the consumers and competing manufacturers.

D. How is the Antitrust StandardApplicable?
This Part begins by noting the current incentives granted to those who are able
to improve society and avoid having to answer to antitrust law. This article amplifies
the disadvantage that such categorical immunization has on welfare. 260 It can be
seen, however, that the antitrust standard is applicable to patent law rights in the

255 Peritz, supra note 2, at 6.
256 Richard M. Brunell, Appropriability in Antitrust: How Much is Enough?, 69 ANTITRUST L.J.
1, 2 (2001).
257 Peritz, supra note 2, at 6.
258 Ritter, supra note 133, at 293. Such tradeoffs are implemented by: (1) the full disclosure
requirement, and the public domain entry reference; and (2) by the defined period of time that
patent law provides the exclusivity to the patentee. Id. Even so, the time period is determined ex
ante and not on a case-by-case basis as antitrust law doctrines examines, will never be accurate and
can over-protect the patentee on the account of society. Id.
259 Brunell, supra note 256, at 4.
260 Ritter, supra note 133, at 293.
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context of the patent misuse doctrine and in compulsive licensing. 261 Furthermore,
patent law deters the refusal to license via "vertical arrangements" between
manufacturers practicing close fields in a joint venture. 262 Yet, while discussing
patent rights, antitrust law hardly supplies the answer for a problematic
monopolistic behavior of the patentee as a single manufacturer.2 63
Moreover,
attempts of the Supreme Court to bind anticompetitive prohibitions with patent law
provisions have not been heeded. 264
In order to accomplish enforcement of competitive doctrines, by virtue of the
antitrust standard, the patent system has to intrinsically implement certain
provisions and restrictive prohibitions. Thus, patent law will affect any unwelcome
gain of extra market power ex-ante, rather rely on judicial interpretation for applying
doctrines alien to the patent system.26 5 Due to the economic harm patent provisions
may inflict on social welfare, 266 and the unwillingness of the courts to see patent law
as part of the general economical law, 267 Will society achieve the proper outcome.

E. Supporting Welfare by Disclosure
The disclosure requirement, joined with the enablement element, 268 aims to
enhance welfare by enabling other manufacturers to replicate the patent, once it
enters public domain. This preserves an adequate patent-competition balance. 269
Due the reduction in proprietary information via public disclosure, innovators will be
more efficient in innovating around the patent. Moreover, disclosure helps moderate
the competitor's marginal cost curve, whereas the information disclosed virtually
economizes expenditures, which have already been spent by the first innovator. 270
Maximizing knowledge permeation into society and industry, alongside
expanding the public access to knowledge, is more than a legitimate social goal,
which might also justify cutting into patent rights. 271 By that perception, the means
have to be suitable in a way that both stimulates the revelation of knowledge and
reduces its scope of propertization. 272

261See supra Part IV.B.

See Weiser, supra note 239, at 561.
263 Feldman, supra note 1, at 410.
264 Id. at 418-20.
262

265 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EFFICIENCY IN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST, STANDARD SETTING, AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 8 (Jan. 18, 2007) (noting that not all competition rationalizations can be

imported from Antitrust law. Nevertheless, Antitrust law will act, regarding to patent holders
behavior or outcomes, ex-post as opposed to its common and desirable way of action.
266 See supra Part IV.B.
267 Feldman, supra note 1, at 425-26, 430.
268 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
269 See Dratler, supra note 73, at 550-52.
270 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 87, at 299.
271Ritter, supra note 133, at 9.
272 See SHAVELL, supra note 69, at 148-49 (discussing "second innovations" as a justified cause,
in particular regarding the quality and advancement competition variables).
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Furthermore, full and good faith disclosure requirements prevent others from
inefficiently spending time and money researching a protected area 273 or developing
near the patent. 274 However, innovators having answered all patent prerequisites,
might in some circumstance might choose to refrain filling for patent thus not
releasing their knowledge. 275 Therefore, regimes should chart a legislative course of
action that will enhance disclosure, 276 rather than motivate innovators to waive
patent system protections and conceal their knowledge. 277

VI. TOWARDS A NEW PATENT MODEL-LEX FERENDA

A. Introduction
The intellectual property law regime has to bear in mind two elementary
criteria, both of equal importance. 278 First, it has to preserve high standards for
encouraging the possessor of the knowledge to partake in R&D. 279 Second, it must
not unduly limit competition, enabling society to advance, even without the innovator
doing its best effort to embody its knowledge. 280
Therefore, patent law, as
implemented correctly, should eventually result only in increasing social welfare and
not just motivation for entrepreneurs. 281
Regarding the tension mentioned above, Professor Philip J. Weiser suggests that
patent system should condone replication via reverse engineering, yet allow engaging
in R&D aside the patent, by that shifting the potential competition from the patent
itself towards complementary goods, thus improving both the competitive
manufacturer and the genuine patentee. 282 The current patent system acknowledges
the importance of privileging inventors to embody their knowledge, only in the
amount where incentives are needed, recouping investments and gaining profits,

273 William T. Fryer, III, Design Patent System for the Twenty-First Century, 24 AIPLA Q. J.
331, 355, 375 (1996).
274 Feldman, supra note 1, at 410.
275 SHAVELL, supra note 69, at149.
276 Fryer, supra note 273, at 353. This concept is especially true regarding small businesses
and private inventors, which by the current patent system are being pushed to the corner while
having to publish their findings before issuing the patent, thus not satisfying their secrecy concerns.
In this context, we are speaking of the un-canceled interim between publicly filing for patent, and
the final registration. Id. at 350-51, 365.
277 SHAVELL, supra note 69, at 149.
278 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Federalized Functionalism: The Future of Design Protection in
the European Union, 24 AIPLA Q.J. 611, 617 (1996).
279 Weiser, supra note 239, at 549-50.
280 Id
281 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 87, at 310.
Whereas the most important question to be
asked under the eyes of the Economic Analysis of Law, is whether the Patent Law regime in present
is cost effectiveness in terms of welfare.
282 Weiser, supra note 239, at 566.
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without driving inventors far from marginal costs. 283 Yet, as economic research
shows, patentees increase their marginal costs, attaining monopoly advantages. 284

B. Alternative Means of ProtectingPatentable Objects
Henceforth, this section will shortly review faults arising from globalization of
IP influencing developing states, which should be taken into consideration while
rethinking the IPR regime. Professor Peter Drahos claims that developing groups
must enjoy non-intervention over their design of rights, free to design their own
property regime, so they will be motivated to set IPRs in a way that will maximize
social welfare. 285
Therefore, intellectual property law cannot move to lower
standards than those existing on a global scale, nonetheless it is expected to
ascend; 286 and (2) welfare growth potential is most likely to be narrowed to the
average global degree. 287 Thus, the state will not be able to enjoy economic benefits
arising from lower standards of IPR protection. 288 Where the relevant economy is
closer to a developing state situation, the limitation will be more effective and have
stronger (i.e., negative) applications over the economic growth potential. 289
Professor Drahos suggests recognizing patent rights as a basic human right,
addressing patent law as part of the constitutional law. 290 Addressing patents in a
constitutional manner allows restricting patent rights and comparing them to other
constitutional values. 291 Accordingly, there has to be a brilliant constitutional
competition model, or else one returns to the starting point, while both values,
detached, do not produce an efficient outcome.
Another proposal, by Professor Michal Abramowicz, is to reward innovators with
patent prizes rather than excessive rights. 292 Rewarding innovators with prizes

283 MASOUDI, supra note

265, at 3.

284 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 87, at 311.

285 Drahos, supra note 154, at 2. In his paper, Professor Drahos, bases the assumption than
non-intervention promotes a potential for economic growth.
286 Id. at 2, 6-7.
287 See generally Musu, supra note 148 (regarding the developing states' lack of entrepreneurial
capabilities and inadequate financial means).
288 See id.; see also supra Part IV.A (explaining that benefits drawn from lower standards of
protecting IPR, are manifested by all competition around the producing of any innovative product, in
sense of the equilibrium achieved under free competition variables).
289 Musu, supra note 148, at 13.
290 See Drahos, supra note 154, at 15.
291Brunell, supra note 256, at 3-4. In the context of this article, this refers to values that
derive mostly from the freedom of occupational choice. Amongst them (and mainly) is the
constitutional principle of competition. This article hereby reinforces Drahos's proposition, and
suggests that patent law should nut deny operatively addressing competition rationalities, however
invoke all relevant features from the antitrust standard, and enforce them on the patent system.
292 Abramowicz, supra note 243, at 128. Professor Abramowicz bases his assumption on
grounds of a non-proportionate system, which endows a constant privilege by each patent, without
matching the benefit society would be rewarded with, alternately the deficiency which society may
endure by denying the inventor a patent motivate-the specific time period patent law awards. Id.
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increases welfare by reducing the deadweight loss. 293 In Abramowicz's outlook,
implementing the prize system in full, and not setting aside the current patent
system, should in the long run, null the deadweight loss. 294 State granted rewards
for creative action, while softening the proprietary regime or even replacing all
intellectual property by a full state buyout of the invention, may lead to consumption
increases along with competitive pricing (competition variables of outputs and
pricing). 295
The prize, given to the inventor, which can either be fixed, or calculated on an
estimation in negotiation between the patent applicant and the state, requires an
assessment of both the patentable innovation and the amount of the deadweight loss
which society will bear. 296
Due to added costs of negotiation, states tend to fix the prize value and avoid
negotiating with every innovator individually. 297 Because innovator is biased and
will likely value its innovation higher than, the suggested prize, the whole system is
endangered. 298 A solution may be found by revising the fixed price annually and by
diversifying innovations into varied prize divisions. 299
The prize value can fluctuate between and the assessment of the patentable
innovation and the amount of the deadweight loss, however the inventor will push
towards a prize value closer to the deadweight loss. 300 Nevertheless, the fact that
there is asymmetric information will presumably not have an extreme negative effect
upon negotiation, though the state is less risk averse than the individual inventor.301
Therefore, society achieves an approximate Pareto optimum result, while the
inventor secures his return.302 Likewise, the state benefits from a competitive-like
equilibrium in the supply and demand model and increasing the consumer surplus. 303
In addition, by implementing the prize system, society presumably stimulates private

293 Id. at 129. This article supports the notion that that the exclusivity patent law grants, does
not consider the patent subject ad hoc, nor its contribution or necessity for society.
Notwithstanding, customizing a patent regime that distinguishes each patent subject, and
calculates its optimal monopoly time period, cannot be efficient at all, nor is it cost effective. It will,
however, produce heavy administrative costs. Thus, it can be deduced that present patent law is
intrinsically in nature incommensurable regarding the social benefit achieved from motivating
inventors and entrepreneurial acts.
294 See generally id. at 180-209 (indicating that a prize system would reduce deadweight loss).
295 SHAVELL, supra note 69, at 138.

296 Abramowicz, supra note 243, at 131-32.
297

Id.

298 Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 223, at 735-37. Although by moving towards a liability rule
and prizing the inventor rather granting a monopoly for a patent term, we allegedly soften the
grounds for negotiation, and succeed finding the golden path for motivating innovativeness, without
having the bargain between state and the inventor at risk. Id.
299 Abramowicz, supra note 243, at 131-33.
300 Id.
301 Id. at 131 (indicating that the Shavell and van-Ypersele model can be used as a good
milestone for a new patent system).
302 Id. (noting that by receiving the 'prize' in advance, the innovator is secured by a state
contract. Thus, benefiting from investment channels' interest in less risky innovative R&D
investments).
303 Id.
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and small innovators that find trouble in funding R&D, by offering them a greater
and in shorter time to ROI.304

C. The Suggested Model

1. Standard Setting System
A good starting point to eliminate manipulations in licensing is to apply
standard settings in contractual agreements regarding patents.
Such standard
settings are subject to criticism and limits. Thus, it is an executive authority's duty
to shape standard settings so it will correctly balance between incentives to initially
engage in R&D, and keep the competition variables at an optimum. 305 The executive
authority, alongside the legislator, should establish more professional standard
setting organizations ("SSOs") and strengthen them, 306 by adjusting specific standard
settings for patents by field. 307
Due to the nature of antitrust law, one cannot expect it to substitute for SSOs
and achieve all of the advantages of the SSOs in governing by legal rights. 308
Scholars support the premise by which SSOs governing patents will deter abuse of
patent rights, at least theoretically, in the sense of monopolization and the restriction
of trade. 309 Furthermore, establishing SSOs that specialize in contracts and licensing
patents will help achieve the implementation of competition rationales, which cannot
stem from importing antitrust law provisions to patent law cases. 310 Furthermore,
establishing SSOs which specialize in licensing patents and contracts regarding
patents will help achieve, ex-ante, the implementation of competition rationales,
which cannot stem from importing antitrust law provisions to patent law cases. 311

2. DiversificationBetween Patent Classifications
Not all inventors enjoy the same incentives, nor do they treat them in a similar
manner. As previously discussed, inventors may act regardless of the present IP
regime at present, such as in the internet world where a proprietary entitlement is

304 Abramowicz, supra note 243, at 223.
305 MASOUDI, supra note 265, at 5 (speaking of optimizing the economic surplus both from the

manufacturers' and the consumers' point of view).
306 Lemley, supra note 128, at 1901-03.
307 Weiser, supra note 239, at 583 (regarding, amongst other things, governmental funds in
order to establish standar'd setting organizations).
308 Lemley, supra note, 128, at 1930-34 (discussing the interplay between SSOs and existing
antitrust law).
309 Id. at 1923-25.
310 MASOUDI, supra note 265, at 13.
311 See supra Part IV.
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descriptively not utilitarian.3 1 2 Notwithstanding, a strict proprietary regime might
reduce motivation to invent, due to costs of protection in the eyes of the inventor.313
To sum up, in the absence of exclusionary privileges for inventors in certain
fields, it is rational and suitable that SSOs will take the place in designing the
efficient patent rule, under an assumption that SSOs hold specific field expertise like
the World Wide Web Consortium for Internet Software. 314
In this context, a
tendency towards an open access regime will provide sufficient incentive to produce,
and increase consumption, so the aggregate social welfare will rise. This will set
grounds for diversification in protecting classified inventions, improving the system
by addressing the patent subject ad hoc, without imposing a serious economic
burden.

3. Promoting Competition in the Patent System
Scholars, in modern times, often criticize patent law's social economic objectives,
by practicing the dominant view that patent rights should at first grant exclusivity.
For example, Professor Rudolph Peritz mentions the necessity of reducing
propertization scope in patent law, which can be noted in the same breath with the
Kaplow and Shavell's tendency towards a preferable liability rule directly importing
doctrines from the antitrust standard into the patent system. 315 A basic argument
against the current system is that without a modern, specifically adjusted, legislative
step for enhancing competition around patents, other than by the 'general' antitrust
law protection will always be below optimum. 316
Another argument, which stems from criticizing the constant twenty year patent
term, is that patent law fails to promote the expansion of public access to knowledge,
in means of effectively exposing other innovators and manufacturers to newly
embodied information, as they play catch up at the end to the patent term. 317 In that
context, society can be more supportive in reducing, or at least adapting, the patent
term to the patentable subject in hand, or at least by class. 318
For example, by pre-adjusting the duration of the patent, to increase
nominatively with R&D costs, will not harm the incentive element, and conversely
will materialize the incentive derived from the inventor's ROI paradigm. 319
Additionally, society will benefit from effective values of competition variables,
particularly pricing, and expansion of the public domain. 320 By applying a standard

312 Weiser, supra note 239, at 569-71.

Id. at 570.
Lemley, supra note, 128, at 1943, 1948-52.
315 Peritz, supra note 2, at 1.
316 Id. at 5.
313
314

317

318
319
320

1d.at7
78.

Feldman, supra note 1, at 445.
See supra Part IB.
SHAVELL, supra note 69, at 145-46.
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setting system and establishing SSOs, society relatively avoids increasing social
costs, which would arise by adapting a patent system on a case-by-case basis.3 21
It is a fundamental premise that patent law, even though containing some
patent abuse mechanisms, is neither able nor intended to care about any of the
competition rationales, mentioned in this article. 322 Nevertheless, the patent system
should incorporate a formula by which the balance between incentives and
maintaining the antitrust standard doctrines permeates competition and assimilates
pro-competitive principles intrinsically. 323
Such an action will be, of course,
uncommon to the negative sense in which antitrust law examines ex post a violation
of competitive values.
This action will have a preliminary evaluation of the
necessary motivations-adopting an intrinsic ex ante antitrust examination.
It is also relevant to consider pre-adjusting the antitrust standard, assimilated
in a new patent model, and not modifying patent law to the current antitrust law, in
order to achieve an efficient balance between the required incentive and competition
variables. 324

VII. CONCLUSION

After all mentioned above, this article concludes that the current patent system
imposes an economic barrier on society, thus preventing society from advancing in
the very course which was intended for patent law. As originally legislated, it tended
to lead to improving social welfare. 325 Therefore, any model which bears in mind a
reduction of the deadweight loss by increasing the amount of competition variables,
will have a desirable outcome, even if just to open the gateway for changing the
patent status quo. 326
Policymakers should recognize the contribution that manufacturers, other than
the 'first to apply', may have for researching and developing a product embodying
innovative knowledge. Thus policymakers should adapt a property regime which is
able to effectively stimulate cooperation between manufacturers, researchers, and
innovators while reallocating exclusivity rights by efficiency analysis. 327 They must
apply an anti-commons property regime where necessary, in order to avoid underuse
of the patent. 328 Nevertheless, any new model, which takes pro-competition in mind,
should be adapted ad hoc to the relevant field in which it occupies, though there are

321 Lemley, supra note 128, at 1957-58 (indicating the adaptation of the existing patent
regimes to SSOs).
322 See Peritz, supra note 2, at 6.
323 Dinwoodie supra note 278, at 667-68 (explaining that a harmonized system, which balance
between both inventor's stimulations and maintaining competition, is not beyond reason).
324 See Kieff & Paredes, supra note 219, at 184, 204 (noting that antitrust law does not, nor can
it, prohibit neither mar'ket power nur holding a lawful monopoly).
325 See supra Part III.
326 Abramowicz, supra note 243, at 180-81 (departing from the status quo IP regime via a prize
system).
327 Heller, supra note 160, at 641.
328 Id. at 669.
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miscellaneous circumstances, by which exclusionary rights are desirable in order to
advance competition and social welfare.329
Efficiently implementing the guidelines for a patent rights system, as suggested
in this article, one must bear in mind the economic and commercial purpose of patent
law, as cited above by Feldman, which cannot be anything other than: "[t]he overall
benefit to society, rather than the benefit to an individual inventor, that is paramount
in the patent system." 330 However, due to inherent contradictions between antitrust
law and patent law as fortified by the Supreme Court in Morton Salt,331 it will be
more efficient not to adjust antitrust doctrines, but rather forming a new patent
system which will endeavor to achieve competition rationalizations. 332
Harnessing all of the above, formatting a new patent system, should in general
represent:
*

Diminishing the propertization criteria, when the innovation may enjoy
more than a single IPR, and in order to prevent extending the time
period before the innovation enters public domain.

*

Referring to the patentable character specifically, for example, differing
pharmaceutical patents from organizational structure models, by
forming specific and professional standard setting organizations.

*

Standardizing and moving to standard setting organizations, rather
than enabling patentees to act on behalf of their own personal interests.

*

Reducing and regulating the amount of market power attained by
patentees so it will not be possible to attain extra market power that can
lead to imposing a deadweight loss (beyond what is necessary for
motivating innovativeness).

*

Amplifying disclosure and the will to disclose information (such as by
reducing the term between filling and registering), correspondingly
reducing the protection over the knowledge itself and expanding the free
access to the knowledge.

*

Limiting the possibility for tying-in a patent, by allowing innovators to
implement knowledge more freely around the patent, without entering
the boundaries of patent infringement, yet use the innovative
information.

329 Lemley, supra note 128, at 1938-39.
330

Feldman, supra note 1, at 400.

331See supra Part IV.

332 Peritz, supra note 2, at 14-15. Though antitrust seeks remedies ex post, which in a patent
case such remedy can be crucially late for society to succeed achieving the optimal outcome -in that
case we are in need for an ex ante mechanism which will both incentive inventors, and prevent them
from attaining too much market power and imposing a deadweight loss.
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Thus, the outcome will diminish the deadweight loss, and tend to balance the
benefit from innovation, on one hand, and the harm to social welfare due to the
impingement on competition, on the other hand. 333

333 It is to be noted, in conclusion of this article, that the legislative means, which may be taken
into account while forming a new patent system, have not been presented, nor does this article or its
author try to limit policymakers only to statutory amendments.

